Ahead of the next general election cycle, a coalition of policy experts and diaspora advocates has thrown its weight behind electronic transmission of election results—but with a critical distinction: technology deployed for commerce must not be confused with the infrastructure required for credible democracy.
In a joint position paper released in Abuja, the Centre for Contemporary Studies (CCS) and the Nigeria Diaspora Coalition for Change (NDCfC) argue that while electronic transmission is necessary, its current framing has missed the core issue.
“Election data is not the same as POS, WAEC or JAMB traffic,” the statement reads. “Those systems process transactional or institutional records whose failure causes inconvenience; electoral data carries constitutional authority whose compromise affects sovereignty.”
The intervention marks a significant shift in the ongoing debate over whether results from polling units should be transmitted electronically. Rather than taking sides in the familiar polarisation, the groups have called for a forensic approach to system integrity.
They warn that data is vulnerable throughout its lifecycle—at rest, in use, and in motion—and that credible electoral architecture must protect all three stages simultaneously. Without that, they argue, electronic transmission merely relocates distrust instead of eliminating it.
The paper acknowledges concerns from sceptics who question the security of transmitting sensitive electoral data over the public internet. However, it clarifies that proponents of electronic transmission are not arguing that the internet is inherently safe, but rather that verifiability is safer than discretion.
The groups propose a layered security model: device-level signing, end-to-end encryption, hash verification, mirrored servers, and immutable audit logs. “The goal is not secrecy of the data, but immutability of the record,” they write. “Even if seen, it must not be alterable without detection.”
On the national security front, the paper concedes that election data is indeed attractive to both state and non-state actors. Yet it points out that Nigeria’s historical vulnerability has not been remote cyber intrusion, but human interception during physical collation.
“The question, therefore, becomes comparative risk: centralised cyber manipulation versus distributed human manipulation. Neither is impossible; one is easier to prove.”
Crucially, the CCS and NDCfC caution against turning electronic transmission into a “do or die slogan.” Technology alone, they insist, cannot cure electoral distrust.
“Without institutional independence, transparent auditing, and rapid judicial resolution, technology becomes theatre. But without verifiable transmission, every other reform still collapses at the collation stage.”
Their proposed solution avoids both blind adoption and indefinite hesitation. Instead, they call for mandatory demonstrable assurance: the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) should publicly test, certify, and expose the transmission system before the election—not defend it after.
“The argument should shift from ‘trust the technology’ to ‘verify the evidence’,” the paper concludes.
